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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to report on how information security governance (ISG)
arrangements are framed and shaped in practice. Our objective is to examine the extent
to which the similarities and differences in institutional environments can subject
organizations to multiple, competing and even contradictory arrangements for ISG.
Using an interpretive case based research strategy we investigate how ISG
arrangements are framed and shaped in fourteen critical infrastructure organizations in
Australia. We explicitly recognize the socio-technical nature of ISG and draw insights
from institutional theory. Our findings illustrate the heterogeneity and malleability of
ISG across different organizations and highlight the need for an information centric
view.
Keywords: information security governance, critical infrastructure, interpretive case
study
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1 Introduction
Information security governance (ISG) is increasingly recognized as a critical issue for
organizations in terms of accountability, fiduciary duties and delivering value [ITGI
2011]. Theft, destruction or unauthorized access to an organization’s information
technology (IT) and information assets arising from malicious actions, inadvertent
errors or natural or man-made disasters, may result in compromised information, serious
system disruptions, business continuity concerns, compliance breaches, reputational
damage, and a loss of intellectual property, strategic opportunities and shareholder
value. Hence there has been growing recognition in the scholarly literature [Baskerville
& Siponen 2002; Dhillon 2007; Straub, Goodman & Baskerville 2008] and the
practitioner literature [DTT 2007; ITGI 2008] over the past decade that technical
solutions are necessary but not sufficient in meeting information security challenges.
This has refocused attention from viewing information security as an operational
responsibility concerned with technical infrastructure to an enterprise-wide and strategic
business-led responsibility placing greater emphasis on business requirements, engaging
the right people, employing the right technology and protecting critical information
assets [E&Y 2009; Allen & Westby 2007].
A number of normative standards, prescriptive frameworks and models have been
developed to assist in governing information security however no single framework is
recognized or used universally [ITGI 2011:30]. Whilst the challenges of ISG are
universal in terms of protecting information assets, the way each organization responds
may vary according to its specific context, requirements and risk tolerance levels.
To date there has been limited empirical research directed at how the objectives of these
standards and frameworks are actually achieved in organizations [Siponen 2006] and
coordinated with other governance efforts. Further, greater understanding about how
ISG is integrated in the organization and its internal and external influences is required.
This has been identified as especially important in planning ISG audits [Love et al
2010].
In this paper we address these limitations and requirements and focus attention on the
variations in arrangements for ISG. We present the findings and implications of a multicase study of ISG arrangements in Australian critical infrastructure organizations. Our
choice of critical infrastructure organizations as a context for studying ISG
arrangements is based on two key factors. First, critical infrastructure protection is of
national significance for the Australian Government [AGD 2010] providing a rich
empirical context. Second, at a theoretical level it provides an opportunity to examine
multiple organizations in an organizational field based on an issue rather than a product
or market and to investigate the institutional logics that shape ISG in practice. The
research is especially relevant to the Bled conference theme as ISG is part of an
organization's efforts to ensure dependability and reliability in business operations.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we discuss recent developments in
the area of ISG and draw out a socio-technical and institutional view of ISG. We then
present the research aims and objectives, research approach and the key research
findings. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings for ISG and
for enterprise information management more widely.
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2 Changing perspectives on information security
A review of the literature reveals two discernible but overlapping streams of research in
the study of information security. The first (and earlier) stream is largely technical in
perspective and is concerned with the technologies and processes for securing
information and IT assets. A limitation of this work was a lack of focus on
understanding the social, organizational and human aspects of information security in
relation to these technical aspects [Straub, Goodman & Baskerville 2008; Siponen &
Willison 2007]. This led to calls for a “socio-organizational” or “socio technical”
perspective [Dhillon & Backhouse 2001], echoing practitioner concerns for the need to
shift attention “from an information-technology-based, security-centric, technologysolution perspective to an enterprise-based, risk management, organizational continuity
and resilience perspective” [Allen 2005:29].
The second stream of research addresses this limitation and focuses attention on the
need for a process oriented, strategic and organizational wide view [Straub, Goodman &
Baskerville 2008:11, Allen 2005:11]. Hence more socially oriented studies such as
organizational values in information security objectives [Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006],
outsourcing [Karyda, Mitrou & Quirchmayr 2006], institutional influences of
information security [Hu, Hart & Cook 2007], developing information security strategy
[McFadzean, Ezingeard & Birchall 2007] and formulating policy [Baskerville &
Siponen 2002] have been conducted. The subject matter investigated in these studies
reveals the problematic nature of ISG, where our discussion now turns.

2.1 Meaning and scope of ISG
Various definitions and understandings of the term “information security governance”
(ISG) exist in the literature. For example, the IT Governance Institute [ITGI 2006:17]
defines ISG as a “… subset of enterprise governance that provides strategic direction,
ensures that objectives are achieved, manages risks appropriately, uses organizational
resources responsibly, and monitors the success or failure of the enterprise security
programme.”
Allen [2005:6] viewed “governing for enterprise security” (GES) as building on and
expanding “commonly defined forms of governance” which included enterprise,
corporate and IT governance.
Other researchers recognize information security as a part of corporate and IT
governance [McFadzean, Ezingeard & Birchall 2007; Von Solms 2005] or include
aspects of governance in their discussions and categorize their work within the realm of
information security management [Caralli 2004; Dutta & McCrohan 2002]. Thomson
and von Solms [2005] view information security as having an overlapping function with
corporate governance and corporate culture, adopting the term “information security
obedience” to reflect the relationship between all three fields.
Thus, common understandings of ISG appear to be general in scope and to combine
information security with existing conceptions of corporate and IT governance.
Such views provide limited insight into the relationship between information security
and governance, assume there are similar goals and lack clarity as to the governance
roles and responsibilities of senior management and board members with respect to
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security concerns. Thus, the ISG literature recognizes information security as a
governance issue. However, it is largely prescriptive, and provides limited empirical
guidance; there remains a need to develop theory in ISG that looks beyond the newest
“best practice” and provides contextually based understanding.

2.2 From a technical view to a socio-technical and institutional
perspective
As identified above, the combining of information security with the concept of
governance has resulted in the grouping of many heterogeneous elements without
exploration of the interactions between these elements, raising two key issues.
First there is a recognized need identified by scholars in the information security
literature to widen the analytic focus from a technically centric emphasis to incorporate
a “socio-organizational” perspective [Straub, Goodman & Baskerville 2008; Hu, Hart &
Cook 2007]. While this perspective has drawn attention to the importance of social
contexts broadly, it remains unclear as to what the term ‘socio’ in socio-organizational
stands for given the diverse disciplinary spaces that examine social dynamics. For
example Dhillon and Backhouse [2001:147] view it broadly as investigations grounded
in the interpretive paradigm to assist understanding of the organization and social world.
They also appear to use the term interchangeably with “socio-technical” [ibid:p.140].
Hu, Hart and Cooke [2007] adopted a sociological neo-institutional approach to
highlight the influence of institutional factors on organizational actions and behaviours,
using a positivist case study approach.The socio-organizational view conveyed in the
literature does not give sufficient consideration to what Orlikowski and Barley
[2001:152] describe as the “material constraints and affordances of technologies” and
ignores how social and technical elements are linked. We argue that a socio-technical
systems (STS) perspective may assist in bringing further clarity to the field. We view
STS as a set of theoretical principles providing insights into the reciprocally constitutive
nature of social and technical systems [ibid:148]. That is “human and organizational
outcomes [can] only be understood when social, psychological, environmental and
technological systems are assessed as a whole” [Griffith & Dougherty 2001:205].
Further, certain features or types of technologies may necessitate different social
arrangements [Pinch 2008: 468]. Hence, we ground the research approach of this study
in social constructionism ideals.
Second, the extant literature is largely silent on how organizations actually engage with
ISG related activities as the field is heavily populated with descriptive and prescriptive
frameworks. From a socio-technical perspective, these normative models may be
viewed as codified specifications that signal the arrangements and purpose of social and
technical components and their relationship in information security. However, the role
that such frameworks play in governing the protection of IT and information assets in
organizations and how they manifest themselves in the way that organizations frame
their governance arrangements remains under-explored, requiring greater empirical
scrutiny and more contextually attuned theorizing.
We complement the STS view with an institutional perspective, to provide further
insights into how technologies are embedded in complex social, economic and political
settings and consequently shaped by such institutional influences [Orlikowski & Barley
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2001]. In particular we explore the concept of institutional logic defined as “the socially
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and
rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” [Thornton & Ocasio
2008:101]. For example information security, corporate governance and critical
infrastructure may be viewed as three competing institutional orders which have
different beliefs and practices that shape how individuals may engage in ISG.

3 Research approach
The study adopts an interpretive case study approach and is organized as follows.

3.1 Aims and objectives
Against the background of change in ISG outlined above and the adoption of a sociotechnical systems stance we articulate our core research question as:
How are ISG arrangements framed and shaped in
Australian Critical Infrastructure Organizations?

Our aim is to examine the extent to which the similarities and differences in these
institutional environments can subject organizations to multiple, competing and even
contradictory arrangements for ISG. We explicitly recognize the socio-technical nature
of ISG and in doing so we move away from the question of what ISG is, to questioning
how ISG arrangements are shaped and institutionalized in organizations that are
themselves embedded in complex, changing socio-technical contexts. In support of this
core research question we organized our investigation around three distinct, but interrelated sub-questions that assist us to understand and interpret contextual variations in
ISG.
RQ1:What are the drivers and scope of ISG?
The objective of this question is to identify the range and variations in the key drivers
and the scope or focus of ISG initiatives.
RQ2: Who are the owners of ISG?
The objective of this question is to establish the primary owner/responsible agency for
ISG initiatives.
RQ3: Where is the locus of ISG?
The objective of this question is to establish the locus of ISG in relation to IT
governance and corporate governance and its variation across different contexts.

In the following section we provide an overview of the research design and data
collection methods.

3.2 Case study sites
All the companies included in the sample are critical infrastructure organizations.
Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and cyber-based systems necessary for the
efficient operation of economies and governments. In Australia, the following sectors
are deemed to be critical infrastructure – energy, utilities, transport, communications,
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health, food supply, finance, government services, national icons, and manufacturing.
To draw out contextual variations we selected organizations from a range of these
industries and from both the public and private sectors. The resultant sample comprises
6 private companies and 8 public companies. Specific information describing the case
study sites and the key informants is provided in Table 1. Company names have been
changed to maintain anonymity and to meet our research ethics protocol.

Company

Description

Advantage

Integrate IT and
telecommunications carrier,
Australian and Asia Pacific

Bank

Bank – Australia

Best Practice
Co

Retail water utility. State owned

Consultant

No. of
Employees

Revenue

380

$228m

Key informants
CEO/Director, GM Data &
Security, Security Practice Mgr
(+interim Info Security Officer)

$346.4m

Chief GM IT (CIO equivalent)

357

$356.8m

GM Finance/Company Secretary,
CIO

Global provider of professional
services

3724 (Aus)

$676m
(Aus)

Differentiator

Information management
company

600 (Aus)

$196.6m

CFO

Distributor

Electricity transmission provider.
State owned.

974

$452.6m

CIO

Energy

Electricity generator. State
owned.

363

$579m

MD/Director, IT/Communications
Mgr, Risk Mgr.

Electrical

Retail/distribution electricity
company. State owned.

984

$663m

CEO/Director, CIO, Non-exec
director

Electricity

Retail/distribution electricity
company. State owned.

2176

$1.3b

GM Regulatory & Corporate
Affairs (including IT responsibility)

Healthy

Health insurer

1100

$1.9b

Group Executive (BU) (former
CFO and acting CEO)

Retail Gas

Retail market administrator,
virtual company.

2

n/a

CEO

Start-up

Newly formed, emergent gas
production company

80+
contractors

$6m

COO, Executive Chairman

Water

Electricity generator, State
owned.

870

$439.8m

Virtual

Retail market administrator,
virtual company.

1

n/a

CIO Oceania

CEO/Director, GM Corporate
(including IT responsibility)
CEO

Abbreviations:
CEO:

Chief Executive Officer

COO:

Chief Operating Officer

GM:

General Manager

CIO:

Chief Information Officer

CFO:

Chief Financial Officer

MD:

Managing Director

Mgr:

Manager

Table 1: Case sites and key informant summary
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3.3 Data collection and data reduction
Primary data were collected from 23 semi-structured interviews with Chief Executive
Officers, Chief Information Officers and other senior officers, including executive and
non-executive company directors at the 14 case study sites. All interviews were digitally
recorded as audio files and subsequently transcribed into text files. In addition,
secondary data comprising documents provided by the participants and publicly
available information, contributed to the data collected. The primary aims of the
research data analysis were to understand the cases themselves through the coding of
the primary and secondary data to identify key themes and understand the relationships
between them. Following Miles and Huberman [1994], a mixed data analysis approach
comprising content analysis, thematic analysis and comparative analysis was adopted.
This involved analyzing the data using codes and memos, reducing information via
themes, and relating code categories. Within-case comparisons using coding techniques
served as the basis for developing 14 individual organizational case studies, and crosscase comparison allowed for the identification of similarities and differences between
the sample companies.

4 Findings
In the following sections we present our study findings. We organize their presentation
around the three research sub-questions: drivers and scope of ISG, ISG ownership and
locus of ISG.

4.1 Drivers and scope of ISG
Three distinct drivers of ISG were identified: 1. Legislation/Cyber Threat, 2. Business
Continuity and 3. Strategic Differentiation (Figure 1). For all cases the most significant
driver shaping ISG initiatives is regulatory compliance and protection against cyber
threats.
As designated critical infrastructure organizations all the cases are subject to coercive
regulatory pressures imposed by the Australian Federal and State governments. All
cases have also been subject to normative pressures from institutional agents such as
professional bodies, and/or by the existence of perceived “best practice” organizations.
The only information security standard which has been fully adopted is ISO 17799 (now
known as ISO 27002) by Advantage, and its Australian version AS/NZS 17799 (now
known as AS/NZS 27002) by three other cases. The remaining cases have been guided
by AS/NZS 7799 and have adopted various portions of this standard on a more informal
basis, electing not to gain security certification. They also follow certain aspects of the
COBIT and ITIL frameworks. ISG is generally driven through an amalgamation of
other integrated processes such as risk management. Hence, other standards, such as AS
4360 (Risk Management, now known as AS/NZS ISO 31000) and ISO 9001 (Quality
Management) and regulations and guidelines, such as the Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and
Best Practice Recommendations have been followed.
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Figure 1: Drivers and scope of ISG

Whilst there is evidence of other drivers such as business continuity needs, customer
imperatives and strategic differentiation, only two of the fourteen cases, Advantage and
Differentiator have been influenced by all of these drivers. In both these cases
information security is a core competency, as well as an operational necessity
demonstrating a wider scope than the other cases, where the ISG focus is solely as an
operational efficiency. Both Advantage and Differentiator have evolved and matured
furthest toward an enhanced ISG capability, which includes a strategic and enterprise
wide approach.

4.2 ISG Ownership
Two areas of ISG owenership were identified: IT executive and Business executive. The
IT function executive retained primary responsibility in nine of the fourteen cases as
shown in Table 2. In some instances at the Board level, there was a feeling that the
Board members were not IT literate enough to own ISG. In these cases ISG was
consequently delegated to the CEO; the CEO often then delegated the ownership of ISG
to the executive responsible for IT. For the remaining five cases, the Business Executive
for varying reasons owned ISG. For example, Start-up outsources its IT function,
Virtual and Retail Gas are two virtual companies, and Advantage and Differentiator
regard ‘information protection’ as a core competency.
The use of the term information protection in the context of Advantage and
Differentiator denotes they place a more significant emphasis on the information itself.
The findings also highlight a different view from the widespread calls in the literature
for more direct Board responsibility. They indicate that even though the respective
Boards do maintain high-level oversight, Board level ISG leadership, management and
control have been delegated to the Executive in all instances.
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Case site

Primary owner:

Primary Owner:

IT function Executive

Business Executive

e.g. CIO

e.g. CEO

Energy

✓

Electrical

✓

Water

✓

Electricity

✓

Distributor

✓

Healthy

✓
✓

Start-up
Bank

✓
✓

Retail Gas
Consultant

✓
✓

Differentiator
Best Practice Co

✓

Advantage

✓

Virtual

✓

Table 2: Summary of Primary Owners

The findings also revealed the holistic nature of ISG, in all cases, all individuals within
an organization were expected to assume some level of responsibility for ISG;
interestingly this is an issue that is given limited attention in the academic literature.
Futher, whilst the Executive (including IT) and Board were the key actors defining the
organizing principles and normative roles of this function, lower levels within the
organization, as well as extra-organizational actors such as strategic partners and
outsourcing companies have been drawn into the tactical arenas of ISG.

4.3 Locus of ISG
The findings reveal that all case study organizations regard the protection of information
across the enterprise as an important governance function and are committed to
instituting processes to assist integration with IT governance and corporate governance.
However, perceptions vary widely as to the locus of ISG in relation to IT governance
and corporate governance as shown in Table 3. The results suggest that there is no
particular dominant position with respect to the relationship of ISG to IT governance or
corporate governance. Rather, emphasis is placed on the need for integration.
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✓
✓

5

6

Governance
Framework
Covering
Information
Security

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

4
Information
Security
Governance
implicit in
Corporate
Governance only

✓
✓

3

Information
Security
Governance
implicit in IT
Governance

Energy
Electricity
Bank
Electrical
Water
Start-up
Retail Gas
Distributor
Healthy
Consultant
Differentiator
Best Practice Co
Advantage
Virtual

Outsourced IT
function

Case
site

2

Separate
Information
Security
Governance
Function

1

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
v
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Table 3: Summary of locus of ISG

4.3.1 Information security governance implicit in IT governance
As shown in Table 3, three organizations, Energy, Electricity and Bank, have subsumed
their ISG initiatives within their IT governance activities (column 3), which are in turn
overarched by corporate governance for different contextually based reasons. For
example, Energy, a State owned corporation, is a major electricity generating
corporation in Australia, involved in competitive trading of electricity in the National
Electricity Market (NEM). Its major business activities are electricity production and
energy trading. Within this company, ISG is considered a component of IT governance,
which is in turn considered a component of the overall corporate governance. Energy’s
institutional logic has transformed such that it now views itself as an energy trader
rather than merely as an energy generator. This has had important ramifications in
respect of additional security requirements, and consequently a key component of the
company’s IT governance is now a specific ISG Framework.
4.3.2 Information security governance implicit in corporate governance alone
Whilst all cases required ISG to be consistent with the ethos, the principles, and the
activities of their overall corporate governance institutions, only four of cases made it
implicit within corporate governance alone (column 4). In these cases, no additional
specific governance mechanisms are in place to explicitly govern information security.
Rather, it is seen as a very central business issue. Notably, all of these organizations
have outsourced their IT function.
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For example, in the case of Electrical, protecting information across the enterprise is
regarded as an important part of the IT strategy. This company is a State-owned
electricity distribution and retail company. The company’s recent entry to the National
Electricity Market (NEM) has caused it to re-think its governance structure and to
reassess which committees are required to cope with its entry into the national market.
The profile of IT within the company has also been elevated due to its recent entry to
the NEM, and the associated major system changes to allow energy trading. No separate
IT governance initiatives exist within the company, and there are no separate IT
governance or ISG structures. According to a non-executive director, such governance
is taken for granted and completely institutionalized across the organization within the
overall corporate governance risk management process.
In comparison, Start-up is a relatively new company still in the early stages of
development. The company’s main activities are to explore and develop coal-bed
methane gas fields and to produce and sell gas. Given its early development phase, it
has very basic IT requirements. However, its ongoing connectivity to two major gas
companies, and intellectual property associated with its unique geological and
geophysical information necessitates that high IT security levels are maintained. At
Board level, the company has a broad corporate governance focus, rather than an IT
governance or ISG view specifically.
4.3.3 Separate information security governance function
Half of the case organizations have elected to govern information security through
separate, nominated ISG functions, which are congruent with the respective IT
governance and corporate governance initiatives within these organizations. They
represent a mix of private and State organizations and vary considerably in size. Thus,
as seen in column 5 of Table 3, half of the sample perceive ISG as a separate function in
its own right, and five of these seven organizations, Distributor, Healthy, Consultant,
Best Practice Co and Advantage, have instituted specific governance frameworks
covering the protection of IT and information assets, although these are not ISG
frameworks per se, as discussed further below. Two of the companies, Advantage and
Differentiator, regard ISG as a strategic differentiator.
4.3.4 Governance framework covering information security
Eight of the 14 case organizations (column 6) have a specific governance framework of
some kind to govern information security initiatives, whether the organizations
undertake ISG separately in its own right, or as part of wider governance programs.
These overarching frameworks were found to engage all organizational and operational
processes and participants relevant to information security. For example, Energy
governs information security via its IT Governance Framework. Electricity governs
information security via a broad governance framework comprising a multitude of IT,
compliance and risk management strategies and policies.
In only four of the cases, does an actual overarching ISG framework constitute the
cornerstone of ISG. For example, Consultant, a global consulting firm in the financial
sector, has in place an IT Security Framework, IT Strategy and IT Security Policy that
underpin its ISG efforts. Advantage undertakes ISG via its IT Governance Model, Data
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Networking and Hosting Centre Strategies, and IT Security Policy and Strategy.
Healthy, a mutual organization that provides health insurance cover to about 2 million
Australians, governs information security through an IT Security Governance
Framework, which comprises an IT Security Policy, IT Security Procedures, IT Security
Guidelines, a Password Policy, and an IT Security Tolerance Level.
The findings reveal different orientations (for e.g. risk management emphasis versus a
security focus) and variations in the extent to which ISG is framed as a part of or
separate to IT and corporate governance. This highlights how the confluence of multiple
institutional forces and technical contexts are shaping heterogeneous forms of ISG.

5 Discussion and implications for future work
This study set out to examine how ISG arrangements were shaped and framed in critical
infrastructure organizations in Australia through multiple case studies. ISG was
observed as a socio-technical, emergent and situated practice, shaped by the context in
which it was located.

5.1 Heterogeneous and malleable arrangements of ISG
The study paints a picture of diverse ISG approaches in the field and shows that ISG
arrangements vary widely, despite the evidence of some isomorphism. Conformance
and performance objectives for ISG were not found to be universal triggers for decision
makers but institutionally contingent. This suggests that the confluence of multiple
institutional forces across organizations (e.g. intra-organizational relations), fields (for
e.g. critical infrastructure), industries (e.g. energy, water, ICT) and countries (e.g. BS
7799 and AS/NZS 17799 now 27001/27002) may result in variation and heterogeneity
rather than homogeneous arrangements of ISG. For example, the protection of
information was a core competency of Advantage and Differentiator and viewed as a
strategic differentiator in contrast to the remaining cases. Further research is required to
gain a deeper understanding of the mix of defensive, protective and enabling foci
adopted in practice. In addition, an examination of the events leading up to and
processes involved in the institutionalization and de-institutionalization of ISG is
needed to progress understanding of socio-technical change surrounding ISG in
organizations.

5.2 Multiplicity of beliefs, norms and social logics in ISG
At the field level organizations were formed around the issue of critical infrastructure,
as well as in some cases, but not all, similar products and markets. However, ISG in
each case organization was found to be a mix of laws, regulations, material practices
and strategic imperatives. Hence a multiplicity of cultural beliefs, norms and social
logics were found to be at play. These findings support claims in the institutional
literature (see for e.g. [Schneiberg & Clemens 2006]) of how fragmented fields can
subject organizations to multiple, competing and contradictory logics. Connecting the
activities of people and organizations that are informed by and embedded in these
multiple logics requires further research.
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5.3 Institutional possibilities and extended governance
Whilst the board members and senior level management have leading roles, the findings
point to other significant actors such as outsourcing partners and lower level
management. The ownership of ISG was not necessarily based on single autonomous
organizations. Rather, ISG appeared to be accomplished by interactions and multilateral
relationships within and across organizational boundaries. This suggests that single
organizations may not be equipped to deal with the complexity associated with ISG
requiring networked type governance arrangements with shared accountabilities. Hence
attention needs to be directed towards not only structures but also the actions of
individuals engaged in steering ISG. Further, the role of professional agents, standard
setters and third party providers may provide insights into the emergence of interorganizational structures and political processes in developing governance arrangements
and further progress the concept of institutional entrepreneurship.

5.4 Need for an information centric view
The protection of the information asset itself was identified as a core competency and
strategic imperative in both the Advantage and Differentiator cases. Whilst it is
commonly accepted that the goal of information security is to protect information
assets, there is an assumption that these assets are readily identified and “there is an
accepted understanding of what it means to protect” [ITGI 2008: 29]. Locating and
identifying information assets, assigning value to these assets and the classification of
information assets as to their criticality and sensitivity is recognized in practice as both a
“daunting” yet necessary task for ISG to be “effective and relevant” [ibid: 30].
We argue that while there has been a shift in perspective from a technology-centric to a
socio-organizational view, there is still significant ambiguity with regard to the concept
of information itself and call for an information centric view. Further, an information
centric view would not only view information as an object of security but also as an
instrument in security; recognized as a critical element in enterprise security intelligence
enablement (ESI) [Felman 2010]. Hence more attention needs to be directed towards
exploring the interdisciplinary terrain of information protection and probing theoretical
ambiguities, to clarify and advance current thinking.
The theoretical, and analytical perspective adopted in this paper provides a valuable lens
in which to examine ISG. The extended theoretical view offered assisted in developing
a richer theory, which revealed not only the complexity in making information security
governable but also the problematic nature of how it is governed. We hope that the
analysis presented in this paper may serve to stimulate further interest in ISG and the
protection of information more broadly.
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